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SUPPORT ORDERS, CHURCH COURTS, AND THE RULE
OF FILIUS NULLIUS: A REASSESSMENT OF THE
COMMON LAW
R. H. Helmholz *
N 1973 the United States Supreme Court held that a state violated the equal protection clause by denying illegitimate children a right to parental support granted to legitimate children.'
Commentators have regarded that decision as a worthy departure
from the common law rule that denied illegitimate children any
right to support from their father. But, as those commentators have
noted, the decision simply forbade discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children.2 It stopped short of granting an absolute right to support. It did not challenge the widespread American rule, based on English common law, that in the absence of
statute an illegitimate child has no inherent right to parental support.
This article suggests that the approach of the American courts
rests on a misreading of the historical evidence. Admittedly, the
treatment of illegitimates at English common law is well established. "The common law of England," concludes a leading contemporary authority, "was ruthless in its denial of any rights to
children born out of wedlock." 3 He merely repeats what every
case,4 every treatise,5 and every law review article" states. The
Professor of Law and History, Washington University, St. Louis; A.B. Princeton
University (1962); LL.B. Harvard Law School (1965); Ph.D. University of California,
Berkeley (1970). The author would like to thank Professors E. G. Welton, Frank Miller,
and Charles Haworth for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 See Gomez v. Perez, 409 US. 535, 538 (1973).
2 See, e.g., Margolin, Family Law; Rights of Illegitimate Children, 1973/1974 ANN.
SURVEY Ams. L. 233, 245-46; Shaw & Kass, Illegitimacy, Child Support, and Paternity Testing, 13 HOUSTON L. REV. 41, 45 (1975).
3 1 S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.08, at 1-27 (4th ed. rev. 1975).
4 See, e.g., Baugh v. Maddox, 266 Ala. 175, 95 So. 2d 268 (1957); Schneider v. Kennat,
267 App. Div. 589, 47 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1944); Butcher v. Pollard, 32 Ohio App. 2d 1, 5, 288
N.E.2d 204, 207 (1972); Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1069 (1924).
5 See, e.g., P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAw 592-93 (5th ed. 1976); H. CLARK, LA'Wv OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 5.1, at 155 (1968); W. HOOPER, THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 135-36 (1911);
J. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DoaIsnc RELATIONS § 105, at 348
(1931).
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bastard was filius nullius, a child without rights. According to
traditional thought, only the passage of the Elizabethan Poor Law
in 1576,' when the burden of supporting illegitimate children from
parish funds had grown too great for men to bear with equanimity,
fastened an obligation to support on the father. That statute,
moreover, never formed part of the common law received by
American courts. A strictly penal measure, meant rather to preserve parish funds than to protect infants, it allegedly left intact
the fundamental proposition that the bastard was filius nulliusA
Initially, this proposition should arouse suspicion. The society
that spawned the common law admitted no great disjunction between the teachings of morality and the dictates of law; and the
duty to care for one's child, legitimate or not, was a part of the
moral teaching of the time. This duty was enjoined on men by
natural lawY The country that gave birth to the common law was
also ruled by a succession of kings descended from an illegitimate
sire." American courts and commentators should have been skeptical of the proposition that such a society cast no enforceable obligation on the parent to care for his newly born infant.
In fact, the proposition is mistaken. The illegitimate child had
an enforceable support right prior to 1576. True, the common law
itself did not provide an action against the father of a bastard child.
But the obligation to support was enforced in the courts of the
English Church. The common law's apparent neglect of the child
indicates only the jurisdictional boundary between the courts of
Church and State, not a disregard of the illegitimate child.
6 See, e.g., Stone, Illegitimacy and Claims to Money and Other Property: A Comparative
Study, 15 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 505, 507-08 (1966); Note, Liability of Possible Fathers: A
Support Remedy for Illegitimate Children, 18 STAN. L. REv. 859 (1966); 6 BAYLOR L. REV.
520 (1954).
7 18 Eliz. 1, c. 3 (1576).
8 See 1 I. PINCHBECK & M. HEwiTr, CHILDREN IN ENGLISH SOCIETY 206-14 (1969); Robbins
& Desk, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study,
30 COLUT[. L. REv. 308, 316-19 (1930).
9 Thomas Aquinas echoes the same Roman law text used by the canonists to show that
the care of one's offspring is part of natural law. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE la2ae.94,2
(28 Blackfriars ed. 83). See also text accompanying notes 18-20 infra. The right to existence and upbringing must, of course, be distinguished from the right to inherit from the
parent.
10 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 397 (2d ed. reissued
1968).

HeinOnline -- 63 Va. L. Rev. 432 1977

Filius Nullius

1977]

Proof of this assertion must rest in an examination of the canon
law enforced in the English ecclesiastical courts.1 ' This territory is
unfamiliar for the legal historian as well as the lawyer. It calls for
an investigation of proceedings not treated by most texts. But the
development of the common law rules regulating domestic relations cannot be understood without it. Justice in England was not
a unitary matter. Merchant courts, borough courts, and ecclesiastical courts all exercised jurisdiction over matters not covered, or
only partially covered, by the royal courts. Whatever conflicts might
have arisen among the various courts, all men assumed that each
tribunal would carry out part of the total task of regulating men's
behavior. Marriage, probate, and defamation, for example, all
belonged to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. 2 No one
disputed this allocation. As this article will show, enforcement of
a father's duty to support his illegitimate child also fell within the
purview of the canon law. Only in this restricted sense did the
common law deny the illegitimate child the support of his father.
I.

THE CANON LAW

The law of the Western Church required the father to support
his child, even if the child were born out of wedlock. The duty is
a notable example of the twin influences of humanity and Christianity on the law. Classical Roman law had imposed no obligation
on the father; the regime of patriapotestas allowed him the power
of life and death over any of his offspring. 3 Imperial legislation
softened this regime by requiring the father to support children
born of legitimate marriage or of the recognized Roman form of
11 In medieval England, every bishop and every ecclesiastical dignitary kept a regular
court of law, in which his officials administered the canon law. These courts had jurisdiction over both clergy and laity, they met approximately every three weeks in regular
session, and the main courts were staffed by professionally trained lawyers and judges.
There were, in other words, few places in England without contact with the legal system
of the Church. For a good description of the courts of one English diocese, see B. VOODCOCK, MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF CANTERBURY (1952).
12 S. 'Mmsoi, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 13-15 (1969).
13 W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 103 (3d ed.
rev. 1963). The scholarly literature on the subject in Roman law is extensive, and not
free from disagreement. Two fairly recent articles containing reference to earlier literature
are Lanfranchi, lus exponendi e obbligo alimentare nel diritto romano classico, 6 STUm.fA
ET DOCUMENTA HISTORIAE Er IURIs 5 (1940) and Zoz, In tema di obbligazioni alimentari,
73 BULLETTINO DELL' ISTITUTO DI DRnrtrO ROMANO 323 (1970).
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concubinage.14 But even under Justinianic law, the father had no
duty to support spurious children.' 5 That duty was added by
medieval canon law. Pope Clement III's decretal letter setting
forth the obligation was later incorporated into the Gregorian
Decretals (1234), thereby becoming a standard text for the courts
of the Western Church.'6 Parents had to furnish the necessities
of life to all their children, according to the standard their means
allowed. Even the child born of fornication or adultery had the
right to this basic protection.
The medieval canonists and civilians who treated the question
did not undertake as detailed and thoughtful an analysis of the support obligation as did the jurists of the 17th and 18th centuries. 7
But many canonists pointed out the distinction between Roman
and canon law. They justified the latter as superior. Hostiensis
(d. 1271), for example, distinguished the canon law rule from the
"rigor and severity of the secular laws, . . .which nature neither
moves nor softens." Children, he wrote, "are always to be nourished, according to the benevolence and equity of the canon law, natural law being considered." 's Antonius de Butrio (d. 1408) defended canonical usage on several grounds: "And note that the Church
intrudes itself into [questions of] providing sustenance to a son,
and this because of the sin against the instinct of nature, or when
See 3 B. BIONDI, IL DirI-ro ROMANO CRISTIANO 290 (1954); 1 P. BONFANTE, CoRSo
DIRrrTO ROMANO: DIRITTO DI FAmIGLIA 379 (1963).
15 NOV. 89.15.pr. This text, from the Novels of Justinian, can be found in 3 CORPUS
IURIS CIVWLIS (T. Mommsen, P. Krilger, R. Schoell, & G. Kroll eds. 1911). There is a translation of the entire corpus of Roman law in THE CIVIL LAW (S.Scott trans. 1932).
16 X 4.7.5 (2 CORPUS JuRIs CANONICI, Col. 688 (A. Freidberg ed. 1879)). A modem commentary which recognizes this in passing is Ayer, Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L.
REv. 22, 23 (1902).
17 Compare, e.g., BARTOLUS (d. 1357), COMMENTARIA at DIGEST 25.3.5.17, no. 1 (1580-81),
with H. GRonus (d. 1645), DR IuRE BELLI ET PACIS lib. 2, c. 7.4 (1646). Canonists were
the academic writers on the law of the Church, civilians on the Roman (civil) law. For
the most part their writing consisted of commentaries on the formal rules and enactments
of the two laws. Perhaps because both canon and Roman law were based on official texts,
rather than the system of case law precedent familiar to a modern American lawyer, the
academic writers exerted a substantial influence over both court practice and legal education. For an introduction to the subject, see J. CLARENCE SMITH, MEDIEVAL LAW TEACHERS
AND WRITERS: CIVILIAN AND CANONIST (1975).
18 LECTuRA IN LIBRos DECRETALIUM at X 4.7.5, no. 10 (1581): "Solutio: illud secundun
rigorem et subtilitatem legum secularium, ut ibi., quem nec natura movet nec mitigat, nam
secundum benignitatem et aequitatem iuris canonici semper alendi sunt, considerato iure
naturali."
14

DI
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[sustenance] is denied for want of marriage, or when the Church
fills a gap in the secular forum." ' For him, like most canonists,
the principles of equity and benevolence supplied sufficient reason
to justify the canon law's deviation from the harsh Roman law
rule.2
The divergence between the two forms of law, on the other
hand, did not prevent the canonists from using the Roman law to
justify and define the nature of the support obligation. They cited
texts from the Institutes, Code, and Digest, virtually the whole of
the Roman law, to show that natural law imposed a duty on all
parents to nurture and support their children. They also borrowed
the standards for determining the amount of support, for fixing
the duration of the obligation, and for settling the means of proving paternity from the civil law. They saw no incongruity in using
Roman law texts to shape an obligation towards illegitimate children, an obligation that Roman law itself denied.2 This habit
was not peculiar to paternity proceedings. It is found throughout
medieval canon law. 2' This canonical borrowing, however, does
highlight the often overlooked influence of the civil law upon
English family law. Roman law, enforced first in the Church
courts, later in the royal courts, helped to define the reach of the
obligation to support.
The obligation to support adopted by the medieval canonists
was a more extensive obligation than English or American law
was to enforce subsequently. The duty was, in the first place, a
19 COMMENTARIA IN LIBROS DECRETALIUM at X 4.7.5, no. 6 (1578): "Et nota quod super
alimentis filio, administrandis se intromittit ecclesia; et hoc propter peccatum contra
instinctum naturae, vel quando denegantur propter defectum matrimonii, vel quando
ecclesia supplet defectum fori secularis."
20 See also BALDUS, COMMENTARIA at CODE 6.61.8.4d (1586): "Hic dicitur quod pater
debet alere filium non ratione ususfructus, sed ratione ipsius naturae . . . , quod est notabile dictum." ("Here it is said that a father should support a son not by reason of [the
son's] usefulness, but because of nature itself, which is a noteworthy statement.").
21 A clear example of this use of Roman law is the medieval glossa ordinaria at X 4.7.5
s.v. secundum facultates. Three principles are laid down: 1) that the support should be
given according to the resources available, 2) that the child should be sustained with the
mother before the age of three, after that with the father, and 3) that the obligation was
reciprocal. The gloss supports all three points with citations from Roman law, principally
from sections of DIGFSr 25.3.
22 See generally Kuttner, Som Considerationson the Role of Secular Law and Institutions in the History of Canon Law, 2 SCRIMTi DI SOClOLOGIA E POLTICA IN ONOIRE DI LUIGI
STuRzo 349 (1953); Naz, Droit romain, 4 DIClIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE 1502 (1949).
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reciprocal one. Parents must support their children. Children
must also support their parents.2 3 Need and ability were the
determinants. The duty also extended beyond parent and child.
Grandparents, even aunts and uncles, could be required to support
a child if the primary sources of support, the natural parents,
were too poor. 4 The rights and duties of members of a family
went a good deal further than they do today. The father's duty to
nourish his illegitimate child was only one part of a much broader
obligation.
II.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL REMEDY

So much, of course, is only theory. The English Church courts
did not put into practice every part of the medieval canon law. 5
If the duty of support were one of the parts they omitted, then the
common law really did ignore the plight of the illegitimate child.
Evidence of the conformity of English practice with medieval
canon law must come from the contemporary Church court
records. 6 Those records, unfortunately, are not easy to use or to
23 See, e.g., HoSTIENSIs, LEcTuPA at X 4.7.5, nos. 7-9.
24 See BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA at D1G.ST 25.3.1 § Item rescriptum, no. 2; G. DURANTIs,
SPECULUM IUDICIALE IV, tit. qui fil sint legitimi, no. 6; Joannes Andreae, COMMENTARIA at

X 4.7.5, no. 7 (1581).
25 See, e.g., Donahue, Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: Stubbs vs.
Maitland Re-examined After 75 Years in the Light of Some Records from the Church
Courts, 72 MICH. L. REv. 647, 660-64 (1974).
26 These records, which are today kept in county and diocesan archives throughout
England, are the basis of this article. The majority of the records which once existed has
been lost over the course of the centuries, but the author has examined most of the
surviving medieval-and a large sample of the remaining 16th century records. Citation to
these sources is given hereinafter by diocese. Those used, with corresponding modem
archive, are as follows:
Canterbury
Library of the Dean and Chapter, Canterbury.
Chichester
West Sussex Record Office, Chichester.
Durham
Library of the Department of Palaeography and Diplomatic, University of Durham.
Hereford
Hereford County Record Office, Hereford.
Lichfield
Joint Record Office, Lichfield.
London
Guildhall Library, London [MS. 9064 records] and Greater London
Council Record Office [DL/C records].
Norwich
Norfolk Record Office, Norwich.
Rochester
Kent County Record Office, Maidstone.
St. Albans
Hertfordshire Record Office, Hertford.
York
Borthwick Institute of Historical Research [Cause Papers and A B
Act Books] and York Minister Library [M 2(1) Act Books].
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interpret. 7 They survive in limited quantities, and the scribal
habits of recording in the Act books often conceal more about the
details of litigation than they reveal. Nevertheless, the available
evidence is clear enough to show that the courts did enforce the
obligation to support illegitimate children. The Act books demonstrate that the duty was not mere canonical theory.
Litigated cases imposing support obligations came before the
Church courts in two ways: petitions by the mother on behalf of
the child, -8 and prosecutions ex officio for fornication or adultery
resulting in the birth of a child. 29 Either type of dispute could give
rise to a support order entered against the putative father. A case
heard in the diocese of York in 1371 furnishes a good example of
a petition brought by an unwed mother. Emmota Ripon appeared
before the official (the principal judge in the court) together with
William of Hexham. She "humbly asked that the same William of
Hexham be condemned, compelled, and coerced to contribute to
the support" of the child she alleged he had fathered.30 William
disputed paternity. He "replied and said that he did not know
whether the child was his or not." 31He admitted sexual relations
27 Act books were the official records of procedure taken in the ecclesiastical courts during each court session or consistory. In them, the court scribe recorded the names of
the parties, the subject matter, the action taken (e.g., the introduction of documents, the
production of witnesses, or the delivery of sentence), and the terms assigned for the
next hearing. They were unlike modern judicial opinions, in other words, in that they
were normally confined to procedure. They were intended principally for future reference for internal court purposes. Fuller explanation of the nature of the court records
can be found in D. OWEN, THE RECORDS OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH IN ENGLAND EXCLUDING PAROCHIAL RECORDS
(1974); R. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 7-11 (1974). An example of a particularly full record is transcribed in Donahue
& Gordus, A Case From Archbishop Stratford's Audience Act Book and Some Comments
on the Book and its Value, 2 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 45 (1972).
28 Persons other than the mother could act for the child under the law. See, e.g.,
BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA at DIGEST 25.3.5.2, no. 3: "Quaero an istud officium iudicis possit
implorariab alio quam a filio: Respondero quod sic quia consanguinei et alii admittuntur
ad petendum alimenta pro filio." ("I ask whether the intervention of the judge can be
sought by anyone but the son: I reply that it can, because blood relatives and others
are admitted to seek sustenance for a son.") The mother was the person most closely
concerned, however, and the English cases found were normally brought by the mother.
29 BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA at DIGEST 44.7.52, no. 1: "Alimenta petuntur officio iudicis,
quando non habet unde se alat." ("Sustenance is demanded by virtue of the judge's office,
when [the child] does not have the means to support himself.")
30 Act book M 2(1)c, f. 2r (1371): "[1psa Emmota peciit humiliter ab eodem domino
officiali prefatum Willelmum de Hexham condempnari compelli et coherceri contribuere
alimentacionem dicte prolis per eundem Willelmum ut ipsa asseruit de eadem suscitate."
31 Id.: "Willelmus respondit et dixit ipsum nescire an fuit proles sua vel non."
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with her. But he suspected that someone else equally might be the
father, "because he had been overseas and in other remote parts
for a long time." 32 Like many such cases, this one came before the
court only because the parties could not agree on the fundamental
question of paternity. Emmota, however, swore a formal oath that
William was the father. Having heard this, the official condemned
William to pay two shillings for arrearages and to pay two pence
weekly in the future toward child support. This was an interim
order. The law required support to be paid until the question of
paternity could be determined.3 3 William was given an opportunity
to prove that someone else was the father. The Act book, however,
contains no further entry on the case. William may have acquiesced
in the temporary order, or he may have settled the quarrel out of
court. In either case, the court had acted to protect the child. It
enforced the obligation of the putative father.
Ex officio prosecutions for sexual offenses provided the second
forum for support orders in favor of illegitimate children. The
statistical incidence of detection and prosecution of fornication
and adultery in medieval England is unknowable, but pregnancies of unwed women must have brought to light many such affairs.
When they did, the Church courts routinely required the father
to support the child. For example, at Canterbury in 1465, Walter
Tyler was prosecuted ex officio for fornication with Agnes Elys.
He confessed. The court ordered him to undergo public penance,
to provide a dowry for Agnes, 34 and to "cause the child to be
nourished." The Act book gives no details about what may have
been a very complicated family matter. The possibility of marriage
between Agnes and Walter is not mentioned; nor are the attitudes
32 Id.: "[D]ominus officialis interogavit ipsum Wellelmum an ipsa Emmota fuit cum

aliquo alio homine diffamiata, qui dixit quod nescivit quia fuit per longa tempora in
partibus transmarinis et aliis locis remotis."
33 See the glossa ordinariaat CODE 5.25.4 s.v. examinabit (1582), which- specifies summary
procedure to determine the question of paternity but requires the father to provide
interim support.
34 This may be a result of the civil law rule that a daughter could be disinherited and
denied a dowry by her father if she committed fornication. See CODE 3.28.19; G. DURLANTS,
SPECULUM IUDICIALE IV, tit. qui filii sint legitimi, no. 15. There are several orders to endow
in the English court records, particularly in those at Canterbury, but not enough to say
with any assurance how regularly courts required the guilty man to furnish a dowry for
the woman he would not marry.
35 Act book X.8.3, f. 80r (1465): "Item quod dotat mulierem. Item quod nutriri faciat
prolem etc."
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of their parents, if they had living parents. The judge made no
monetary award, perhaps leaving it to negotiation between the
parties and their families. Clearly, however, the Church courts did
not ignore the child. They routinely imposed the burden of support on the putative father. When the woman was pregnant at the
time of the prosecution, the order specified that the obligation
would attach "when the time comes." "GA search that has been by
no means exhaustive has produced examples of support orders for
37
illegitimate children from the ecclesiastical courts of Canterbury,
Chichester, 3 Lichfield, 39 Lincoln, 40 London,4 ' Norwich,42 Rochester, 43 St. Albans, 44 and York. 45 This list includes virtually all
dioceses where any medieval records remain.46 The support obligation evidently was enforced throughout England.
Whoever initiated proceedings, paternity had to be established
to warrant a support order; and paternity always has presented
hard problems of proof. The medieval commentators recognized
that proof of paternity was "difficult and almost impossible." 47
Following the outlines of Roman law, they therefore adopted a
two step procedure weighted slightly in favor of the child. The
first step was to be handled summarily. 8 If access was established
36 Canterbury Act book Y.1.11, f. 217r (1473): "Et iudex iniunxit eidem quod dotaret
mnulierem ac nutriri faciat puerumn cum tempus advenerit."
37 Id., ff. 225r (1473); 324v (1474). The largest number of support orders found in a
single Act book comes from Canterbury Act book Y.1.10, ft. 180v (1473), 239v (1475), 244v
(1475), 287v (1476), 291v (1477), 325c (1477), 334v (1478), 344r (1478).
38 Act book Ep I/10/l, f. 92r (1509).
39 Act book B/C/2/3, f. 74r (1529).
40 2 ViSITATIONS IN THE DIocEsE OF LINCOLN, 1517-1531, at 15 (35 Lincoln Record Soc.,
A. Thompson ed. 1944).
41 Act book MS. 9064/1, f. 40v (1470).
42 Act book ACT/4b, f. 67r (1533).
43 Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 58r (1446).
44 Act book ASA 7/I, f. 8r (1516).
45 Act book Cons. A B 1, f. 80r (1419). See also THE ROYAL VISITATION OF 1559, at 16,
88 (187 Surtees Soc., C. Kitching ed. 1975).
46 The exceptions are Hereford and Durham, from which I have found no ex officio
proceedings. The records from both do include support cases brought at the instance of
private parties, however.
47 2 J. NfASC'IRDuS, DE PROBATIONIBUS, concl. 788, nos. 5-6 (1703).
48 DIGEST 25.3.5.8; BARTOLUS, COMMENTARIA at id., "In causa alimentorum proceditur
summarie, et sentencia lata non facit praeiudicium in causa filiacionis ordinarieexercenda."
("In a case about support, procedure is summary, and a sentence handed down does not
create a prejudgment in a filiation case proceeding in ordinary course.") . See also B. BIONDI,
supra note 13, at 295.
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and the woman named the man as the father, he was required to
support the child until full hearing and determination of the
claim of paternity. The courts were to accept no defendant's protest or evidence of access by other men.49 Theoretically, this initial
order did not prejudice the second, full hearing on the questionY
The order was intended to guarantee support for the infant once
the woman had made a presumptive case.
In the second hearing, the medieval commentators called for
further proof. But even at that hearing, in the nature of things,
proof of paternity could never reach a high level of accuracy. As a
result the jurists were prepared to sanction "proof by presumptions
and conjectures." 51 They listed the facts tending to prove filiation.
Of these, sexual relations, or at least the continued opportunity for
sexual relations, naturally was the most compelling. Other factors
to be considered were the common fame of the community, prior
admissions against interest by the father, and care for the child as
one's own, even if not coupled with a claim of paternity.5 2 Antonius
de Butrio concluded that "whenever treatment [as one's child] is
coupled with the opinion and fame of the neighbors, this without
doubt proves and concludes filiation." 53 But most jurists left much
to the discretion of the judge. They were content to enumerate
the factors he should consider. They never accepted what has
become the American rule that proof of paternity must be "clear,
convincing, and satisfactory." 54
The scarcity and brevity of the remaining records make it impossible to determine with assurance how closely the English
Church courts followed the elaborations of the jurists. What evidence there is suggests general congruence with medieval theory,
with a greater use of compurgation than the medieval treatises
49 DIGEST 25.3.1.14; 37.9.1.14; CYNUs DE PISTOIA, COMMENTARIA at CODE 5.25.4, no. 4
(1578).
50 DIGEST 1.6.10; 25.3.5.9; BARTOLUS, supra note 48.
51 2 J. MASCARDUS, supra note 47, conc. 788, nos. 5-6; BALDUS, COMMENTARIA at DIGEST
1.6.10, no. 2. See also R. BARBARIN, LA CONDITION JURIDIAUE DU BATARD 33 (1960); L.
CREMIEU, DES PREUVES DE LA FILIA'ION NATURELLE NON RECONNUE (1907).
52 HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA AUREA IV, tit. qui filii
sint legitimi, no. 8 (1574); 2 J. MASCARDUS,
supra note 47, conc. 790-92.
53 COMMENTARIA IN LIBROS DECRETALIUM at X 4.17.3, no. 10: "Dico quod quandoque

concurrit tractatus cum opinione et fama viciniae, et absque dubio hic probat filiationem
et concludit filiationem."
54 See generally 1 S. SCHATKIN, supra note 3, § 3.07.
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would lead one to expect. Some Church courts clearly observed the
division between the initial hearing for support purposes and the
later full determination of paternity. They acted summarily in
the initial hearing. 5 At Rochester in 1456, for example, Richard
Bromlegh was prosecuted for fornication with Agnes Malemete,
who had given birth to a child. He admitted fornication; he denied
paternity. "And as for the procreation of the child, he said that
the woman was defamed with other persons, and therefore he
doubts the fathering." ," The judge, noting this plea, nevertheless
made a summary order. Bromlegh "was warned to pay two pence
weekly for support of the child until it should be established [that
there was] another father." '7 Such summary disposition was the
pattern. The exceptio plurium concubentium, denying support
where other men have had sexual relations with the mother, was
not an absolute bar to support, as many American courts were
subsequently to hold."' In some cases the woman was obliged to
find compurgators, that is, neighbors who would swear they believed her oath, to support her claim. 9 But if she did, the court
made the initial support order envisioned by Roman law and
adopted by the medieval commentators.
About the second, full determination of paternity less can be
said. Virtually all the evidence comes from the initial hearings.
Only one case, a filiation proceeding from Lichfield in 1529, has
survived to show that evidence of common fame and the man's
treatment of the child as his own was introduced. 60 An initial
55 The cases almost invariably reach a conclusion in one or at the most two court
sessions; e.g., Canterbury Act book X.8.3, f. 14r (1463), the record of a case in which the
man was ordered to appear on July 4. He did not appear on that day but did appear on
July 27, when a support order was entered against him.
56 Act book DRb Pa 3, f. 521r (1456): "Et quoad prolis procreationem, dicit quod
mulier est diffamata de aliis personis et ideo dubitat de genitura sua."
57 Id.: "[T]amen monitus est quod solvat ad alimentationem prolis ii d. qualibet septimana quousque constiterit de alio genitore."
58 On this defense, see H. CLARK, supra note 5, § 5.3, at 167. Its checkered career in civil
law countries is interestingly sketched in Schbltens, Maintenance of Illegitimate Children
and the Exceptio Plurium Concubentium, 72 S. AFR. L.J. 144 (1955).
59 Hereford Act book 1/12 s.d. 22 March 1583; Lichfield Act book B/C/2/3, f. 74r
(1529); Norwich Act book AGT/4b, f. 67r (1533); York Act book M 2(1)c, f. 2r (1371).
60 Lichfield Act book B/C/2/3, f. 57r (1529), in which a master of a girl living in his
house was said to have fathered her child. One of the questions put to the witnesses was
whether the master had ever "caused the boy to be supported." There is also some
evidence as to proof of filiation in CHILD-MIARRIAGES, DIvoRcES AND RATFICATIONS, ETC.
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hearing, followed by a realistic assessment of the situation and a
compromise in light of that assessment, may have been all that was
necessary in most cases. Much negotiation and discussion must have
lain behind the bare notations of the Act books. The canon law
permitted compromise of questions involving support, and the
evidence suggests that judges and litigants took advantage of the
permission.'I Judges, in fact, allowed settlement of suits over child
support often enough to imply that they actively promoted settle2
ment, at least settlement under their broad supervision.
Similarly, little can be discovered about the size and duration of
the support order. But indefiniteness was the natural result of the
law. So closely linked was the order to the needs of the child and to
the ability of the father to pay, so hesitant was the law to set any
minimum limit to the obligation, that few fixed rules could be
enforced in practice.6 3 The canonist Joannes Andreae (d. 1348),
for example, noted only that the father must support the child
according to his means, and that the obligation ceased when the
child had means to support himself.6 4 There was no fixed table of
awards. What gloss civilians and canonists gave to the subject concerned the general types of expenses that the obligation encompassed. It included food, shelter, and clothing. But it did not in-

clude payment of the child's debts.65 Whether it covered payment
for medicine was open to academic controversy, the predominant
IN THE DiocESEs

oF CHESTER, A.D. 1561-6, at 85-102 (108 Early Eng. Text Soc., F. Furnivall
ed. 1897).
61 DIGESr 2.15.8. Compromise seems to have been allowed in Roman law even without
the consent of the magistrate, except for future rights to alimenta bequeathed in a will.
See, e.g., G. DURAN'nS, SPECULUM IUDICIALE IV, tit. qui filii sint legitimi, no. 27: "Sed
quaeriturutrum super alimentis transigi posset, et licet ista sint in Summa Azonis tacta,
nota tamen quod de praeteritispotest transigi indistincte, .. . et etiam de futuris, nisi sint
in ultima voluntate relicta." ("But it is asked whether there can be compromise about
support, and although these matters are dealt with in the Summa of Azo, note nevertheless
that over past support compromise is always permitted ....
and even over future support
unless it has been left in a last will.").
62 E.g., Chichester Act books Ep. I/10/1, f. 140r (1511), a support case committed to
arbitration; and Ep 1/10/5, f. 37r (1534), a support case in which formal proceeding
was adjourned "in hopes of concord." ("sub spe concordie").
63 DIGEST 25.3.5.7; HosrIENsIs, LFCrURA at X 4.7.5, nos. 7-8. There is a fairly full
discussion of the point in 5 ALEXANDER DE IMOLA, CONSILIA 55 (cons. 72, nos. 9-12) (1549).
64 CO011MMENTARIA at X 4.7.5, nos. 7, 9 (1581).
65 DIrEsT 25.3.5.14-16; DiGEsT 34.1.6; W.

255 s.v. alimenta (1679).
L. CREMIRU, supra note 51, at 45.
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opinion apparently being that it did.6 6 Baldus de Ubaldis (d. 1400)
gave the broadest meaning to the obligation. "Let the term alimenta be [taken] liberally for all things necessary to life." 67
Given this discretionary standard, the judges must have varied
the size of their support orders to take account of individual circumstances, although in practice they rarely made large awards.
The Act books do not suggest generosity. The amount of support
varied from one penny per week (Rochester, 1347) 68 to six pence
(York, 1374).60 Two pence per week is the sum mentioned most
often in the remaining records, and this amount even into the early
sixteenth century. 0 Most entries, however, specified no exact
amount at all. The order of the court, and the undertaking of the
father, was simply to provide the child's sustenance.
The duration of the obligation also varied. The court records
describe orders lasting until the child reached the age of three 71
and the age of seven, 72 but these may have been meant as interim
orders subject to revision. Typically the entry required support
"until [the child] should come to legitimate age." 3 A few cases
may have adopted the civilian rule that a child was to be nourished
by the mother until age three, by the father afterwards, 4 but the
number does not establish a clear rule of practice. What the records
do suggest is the exercise of judicial discretion and the use of
66 G. DURANTIS, SPECULUM IUDICIALE IV, tit. qui filii sint legitimi, no. 38: "Sed nunquid
is qui praestare tenetur alimenta praestabit et medicinas cum aegrotatur?Dicunt quidam
quod sic, . . . alii distinguunt, . . . Sed primum verius." ("But will one who is obligated
to support also be obligated to supply medicine when there is illness? Some say that he is,
. others make a distinction. But the first position is more correct.").
67 CO'MENTARIA at Code 5.10.1, no. 9: "[A]ppellatio alimentorum larga sit pro onmibus
ad vitain necessariis." See DIGEST 50.16A3.
HAMONIS HETrHE 951 (48 Canterbury & York Soc., C. Johnson ed. 1948).
68 Rr.EGismuR
69 Act book M 2(1)c, f. 18v (1374); another example is Chichester Act book Ep I/10/1,
f. 92r (1509).
70 York Act book Cons. A B 6, f. 196v (1511); Norwich Act book ACT/I, f. 162v (1511).
It is difficult to give an accurate assessment of the buying power of these sums. The
average cost of a hen, for instance, was 1 5/8d. in 1347; 2d. in 1374, and 2 1/4d. for the
period 1400-1540. But the cost of most agricultural products: wheat, barley, and the like,
fluctuated greatly. See I J. ROGERS, A HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE AND PRICES IN ENGLAND
226-35 (1866 repr. 1963); 4 id., 282-91.
71 Canterbury Act book Y.1.2, f. 103v (1398); Lichfield Act book B/C/2/3, f. 213r (1533).
72 York Act book M 2(1)c, L 18v (1374).
73 E.g., Lichfield Act book B/C/2/3, f. 38v (1528): "usque ad etatem legitimam
pervenerit."
74 Canterbury Act book Y.4.1, f. 40v (1540); Norwich Act book ACT/I, f. 162v (1511);
cases cited at note 71 supra.
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private arrangement. Since the law envisioned an obligation coterminous with legitimate need, that is what we should expect.
If the available records are representative, inability to pay was
the only defense offered by fathers once the question of paternity
had been settled. Poverty was, of course, a possible plea under the
law. In 1374 a Canterbury judge accepted such a defense, presumably after determining its truth. He nevertheless ordered the
father to take up the obligation again "when he should come to
more plentiful fortune." 75 One case, heard at Rochester in 1463,
illustrates a court's readiness to provide support. Geoffrey Steyn
was convicted of fathering the illegitimate child of Agnes Jays. He
pleaded insufficiency of assets. "He had nothing in goods except
by the grace and will of his father." 76 The court accepted this plea,
but the judge "asked and induced Henry Steyn the father [of
Geoffrey] to provide for the care of the aforesaid child" until
better arrangements could be made."
Seven years before the case involving Steyn, the Rochester
court had dealt with a similar situation. Apparently the father
could not pay; neither could the mother. But Joan Marot, the
sister of the mother, and her husband were "willing to take the
entire burden of maintenance upon themselves and to support the
child from their own resources." 78 The court approved the arrangement. Such entries reflect the only theme running consistently
through the cases: the concern that someone, and someone related
to the child, take up the obligation to support. Normally, responsi75 Act book Y.1.1, f. 83r (1374). A slightly later causa alimentationis prolis from
Canterbury, recorded in Deposition book X.10.1, f. 33r (1413), includes a witness's description of the defendant: "Habet ad sustentacionem suam vix valorem duarum marcarum
annuatim de bonis propriis; habuit tamen ad medium annum hinc elapsum et ea alienavit
matri sue." ("Out of his own goods he has barely two marks a year for his sustenance;
however he had [goods] half a year ago and he alienated them to his mother.").
76 Act book DRb Pa 3, f. 466r (1463): "Et vir dicit quod nichil habet in bonis nisi de

gracia et voluntate patris sui."
77 Id.: "Et commissariusrogavit et induxit Henricum Steyn' patrem genitoris dicte prolis
ad disponendum pro conservatione prolis predicte quousque clarius constare et melius
poterit pro sustentatione eiusdem et exhibitione providere." In a case recorded in Lichfield
Act book B/C/2/1, f. 74v (1526), the grandfather intervened, apparently voluntarily, to
take up his son's obligation.
78 Act book DRb Pa 2, f. 282v

(1456): "[1]psi vellent totum exhibicionis onus in se

suscipere et dictum prolem exhibere sumptibus suis." As part of the same proceedings,
Thomas Maynard and William Grenehill agreed not to attempt to draw the children
away from the house of Joan and her husband.
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bility fell on the father. But if the father could not offer support,
someone else should be found. This regime is the very opposite of
the notion, so often said to have characterized medieval England,
that the illegitimate child was filius nullius.
Identifying a person obliged to support a child, of course, was
not always the end of the matter. Modern practice abundantly
shows the difficulty of enforcing a continuing obligation that has
no possibility of return. 9 The problem is not new. Many of the
Act book entries involve claims for arrearages, fathers who had
"fallen behind" in their payments. Perhaps encouraged by the
canon law rule that relative need had a legitimate place in determining the scope of the obligation, the fathers had not met
this obligation for long enough to bring the mother to the point
of suing. 0 Suits occurred often enough to suggest that enforcement
of support orders was a continuing problem.
The principal sanction available to the Church courts to secure
enforcement was excommunication. In medieval society that spiritual penalty entailed a considerable loss of civil and religious
rights.81 Excommunication might even eventually result in a defaulting party's imprisonment. 2 But in assessing the nature of the
enforcement in the Church courts, one should note that the judges
did not rely on the threat of penal sanction alone. When a hearing
was adjourned for attempts at arbitration and agreement, the
ecclesiastical officials tried, whenever they could, to induce the
defendant to agree voluntarily to pay support at a level acceptable
to both himself and to the court.83 Defendants often took solemn
79 See W. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 221 (1956); Chambers, The Child-Support Enforcement
Process Study, in C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW
850-56 (2d ed. 1976).
80 E.g., Canterbury Act book Y.1.2, f. 103v (1398), in which Nicholas Barbour was condemned to pay 9s.4d. "pro custodia prolis per xxvii ebdomadas elapsas," ("for custody of
the child for twenty-seven weeks past.").
81 There is a summary of the disabilities in 1 V. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 630-32 (7th ed. 1956).
92 Imprisonment was possible through the use of the English Church's privilege of
"signifying" an unrepentant excommunicate to the Chancery and requiring that the sheriff
imprison him. I found one threat of signification in a causa alimentationis prolis in the
remaining records: Canterbury Act book Y.1.1, f. 3v (1372). On the subject generally, see
F. LOGAN, EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE SECULAR ARM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND; A STUDY IN
LEGAL PROCEDURE FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1968).
83 E.g., Canterbury Act book X.8.1, f. 33r (1401): "Et monitus est ad concordandum
cum matre pro invencione filii." ("And he was ordered to reach agreement with the

HeinOnline -- 63 Va. L. Rev. 445 1977

446

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 63:431

oaths to fulfill the obligation, a practice indicating that the Church
court judges wanted the obligation undertaken as willingly as
possible.84 Support of one's child was an essentially moral duty.
Acknowledgement of the duty and agreement, even reluctant
agreement, to fulfill it played a regular part in Church court procedure. The judges used both conciliation and penal sanction to
enforce support orders for illegitimate children. That the combination did not always ensure continued payment is testimony to a
stubborn and familiar fact of human nature.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576 empowered Justices of the
Peace to compel parents to provide for the sustenance of their
illegitimate children. Reciting the burden to parish funds caused
by illegitimates, the Statute allowed the Justices to require payment for child support "in such wise as they shall think meet and
convenient." 85 The Statute traditionally has been treated as if it
created a new duty.8 6 That treatment is clearly incorrect. The
Statute simply provided a new mechanism for enforcing a duty
previously enforced only in the courts of the Church. The enforcement mechanism adopted by the secular courts did include some
new features, suretyship guarantees to insure payment, for
example. But much of the Statute merely provided for continuation in a new forum of earlier practice. The summary determinations of paternity and the immediate support orders, for instance,
87
followed ecclesiastical procedure closely.
The Statute, therefore, should be seen principally as part of the
great movement of religious and social change in sixteenth century
mother for the support of the son."). Other instances: Canterbury Act book Y.1.4, f. 112r
(1423); X.8.3, f. 14r (1463); Durham Act book III/1, f. 23 (1532); Rochester Act book
DRb Pa 2, ff. 167r (1451); id., f. 183r (1452); cases cited at note 62 supra.
84 E.g., Canterbury Act book Chartae Antiquae A 36 II, f. 28r (1329): "Willelmus
Tenturer ad sancta dei Ewangelia corporale prestitit iuramentum quod solveret pro
sustentacione Mariote filie sue .... ." ("William Tenturer swore an oath on the Holy
Gospels to pay for the sustenance of Mariota his daughter.
85 18 Eliz. 1, c. 3, § 1 (1576).
86 See, e.g., 1 I. PINCHBECK & M. HEwiTT, supra note 8, at 206; Robbins & Deak, supra
note 8, at 317; Comment, Support of Children Born out of Wedlock: Virginia at the
Crossroads,18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 343, 344 (1961).
87 See, e.g., SUssEx QUARTER SESSIONS ORDER BOOK, 1642-1649, at 85, 127 (54 Sussex
Rec. Soc., B. Redwood ed. 1954).
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England. That century redrew the boundary between the spheres
of secular and spiritual obligation. To enforce a father's obligation
to care for his illegitimate children by secular sanction, the result
of the Statute, was to move the duty from one side of the boundary
to the other and to recognize that an ecclesiastical remedy was no
longer enough. A decline in the habits of obedience to the decrees
of the Church courts required a new source of protection for the
illegitimate child."" But the Statute marked no change in the substantive rights of that child. He had been entitled to support from
his father as far back as the records yield reliable evidence.
The 1576 Statute itself did not restrict the Church's rights. It
did not purport to oust ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Like much
Elizabethan legislation, it merely offered an alternate remedy. 9
In fact, the Church courts continued to issue support orders at least
for a time after 1576.90 At some later point, however, the ecclesiastical remedy fell into desuetude. Only secular sanction was effective
enough to be worth invoking. By Blackstone's day the secular
action had become the sole remedy. 91 The old ecclesiastical jurisdiction was forgotten. Its disappearance left the impression that,
prior to enactment of the Statute, an illegitimate child had no legal
recourse against his father for support.
From this vantage point American lawyers drew the not unreasonable, but false, conclusion that at the time the common law
developed, English courts imposed no legal duty on a father to support his illegitimate children. American courts therefore adopted
what they supposed to have been the common law regime. Without
the statute, the conclusion seemed inescapable. Unfortunately, this
conclusion caused, indeed may continue to cause, a measure of
hardship to illegitimate children. Of course, today American courts
88

See generally C.

HILL, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE CHURCH: FROM ARCHBISHOP WHIT-

GIFT TO THE LONG PARLIAMENT (1956); Houlbrooke, The Decline of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Under the Tudors, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 239 (R. O'Day & F. Heal eds. 1976).

89 Other examples: I Eliz. 1, c. 2, § 4 (1558-59) (church attendance) ; 5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, § 5
(1563) (perjury); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8, § 8 (1571) (usury). This fact may affect our estimate of
the purpose of the Act, normally said to encompass only saving parish funds, not concern
for the child's welfare. The desire not to challenge the rights of the Church directly may
explain at least in part the Statute's failure to mention what had been the chief reason
for the Church's jurisdiction, provision of support for the illegitimate child.
90 E.g., Lichfield Act book B/C/2/26 s.d. 16 June 1590; Hereford Act book I/l s.d.
25 July 1577.
91 See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 458.
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and legislatures have in large measure granted to illegitimate
children a legal right to parental support. 2 They have consciously,
sometimes stridently, rejected the common law rule in order to
reach that result. Ironically, in so doing, they have in fact adopted
the regime of the age in which the common law was born.

92 In 1966, one commentator noted that all but three states (Idaho, Missouri, and
Texas) had provisions to compel a father to support his illegitimate child. Note, STAN.
L. REV., supra note 6, at 860. After Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), however, a state
may not discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of support.
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